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Abstract 
This paper examines the growing importance of digital-based financial inclusion as a 
form of organising development interventions through networks of state institutions, 
international development organisations, philanthropic investment and fintech 
companies. The fintech-philanthropy-development (FPD) complex generates digital 
ecosystems that map, expand and monetise digital footprints. ,WV µNQRZ WK\ LUUDWLRQDO
FXVWRPHU¶ YLVLRQ FRPELQHV EHKDYLRXUDO HFRQRPLFV ZLWK SUHGLFWLYH DOJRULWKPV WR
accelerate access to, and monitor engagement with, finance. The digital revolution adds 
new layers to the material cultures of financial(ised) inclusion, offering the state new 
ways of expanding the inclusion of the µOHJLEOH¶, and global finance new forms of 
µSURILOLQJ¶SRRUKRXVHKROGVLQWRJHQHUDWRUVRIILQDQFLDODVVHWV.  
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Introduction 
µ,IZHVROYHWKHVHODUJHSUREOHPVRIILQDQFLDOinclusion, it will be with new business 
models, technologies and innovations. Data allow us to know which innovations work 
DQGZKLFKGRQ¶W¶5RGJHU9RRUKLHV%LOODQG0HOLQGD*DWHV)RXQGDWLRQ 
 
Policy initiatives aimed at µfinancial inclusion¶ (FI) have gathered pace since the global 
financial crisis. The 2008 World Bank Annual Report, entitled Finance for All, stressed 
the importance of FI in the context of the earlier broader paradigm shift in development 
towards the Post-Washington Consensus¶ FRQFHUQ ZLWK µLQFOXVLYH PDUNHWV¶ (Mendoza 
and Thelen 2008). With this, the focus in pro-poor finance moved from micro-credit (as 
provided by microfinance institutions or MFIs) to FI, a term that encompasses a far 
broader range of financial products and providers (Soederberg 2013).     
Since then, strong political headwinds powered the FI agenda in international 
development. By 2011, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), a network of policy 
makers and regulators from ninety developing countries, had been created, with funding 
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and endorsement from the G20. 
Half of its members have since signed the Maya Declaration, a shared commitment to 
µUHDFK WKH ZRUOG¶V  ELOOLRQ XQEDQNHG¶ and put in place national FI strategies in 
partnership with private sector actors (AFI 2014b: 3). At the $),¶V WK $QQXDO*OREDO
Policy Forum (GPF) conference in 2014, the World Bank revealed WKDWLWZDVµrealigning 
resources to support Maya [Declaration] commitments¶ at country level (AFI 2014a: 27), 
reflecting the emphasis on a greater role for private finance in the post-2015 era (World 
Bank Group 2013).  
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In 2014, AFI announced WKDW µWKH 0D\D 'HFODUDWLRQ KDV UHYROXWLRQL]HG LQWHUQDWLRQDO
development cooperation by empowering countries to set their own goals and targets¶ for 
FI (AFI 2014b: 3). In parallel, the Better than Cash Alliance was set up in 2012 with one 
important priority - to digitalize social cash transfers and thus accelerate the inclusion of 
WKHµXQEDQNHG¶ of poor countries. Housed at the UN as implementing partner for the G20 
Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, the Better than Cash Alliance promises that a 
µFDVK OLWH¶ )LQDQFH IRU 'HYHORSPHQW DJHQGD ZRXOG SXW WKH 81¶V 6XVWDLQDEOH
Development Goals within reach (Goodwin-Groen 2015). Both AFI and the Better than 
Cash Alliance are funded by the Gates Foundation and by the Omidyar Network, a 
philanthropic investment organization created by Peter Omidyar, the entrepreneur behind 
eBay. 
What might explain the rapid rise of FI as a model for development cooperation? Two 
distinct explanations have emerged recently. Soederberg (2013) scrutinizes WKH *V¶
efforts to energize development through FI through the lens of global finance-led 
capitalism, a capitalism that obscures in the process its exploitative and speculative 
nature. The µLQYLWDWLRQWROLYHE\ILQDQFH¶5R\FLWLQJ0DUWLQand its spread 
from high-income countries (including segments of the population considered 
µVXESULPH¶to the core of the international development agenda should be understood in 
relationship to broader dynamics of financialisation (see Fine this issue, also Finlayson 
2009; Montgomerie and Budenbender 2015, Bryan and Rafferty 2014). The 
transformation of welfare states in OECD countries that led to the emergence of 
individualised, asset-based welfare (Montgomerie and Budenbender 2015, Finlayson 
2009) is one side of the financialisation-financial inclusion nexus. The push for financial 
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± or financialised ± inclusion in the developing world is the other. Poverty is understood 
as a new frontier for profit-making and accumulation (Elyachar 2012, Roy 2012, 
Soederberg 2013).  
In contrast, some anthropologists of newly emerging forms of money view the 
convergence between philanthropic development, and regulatory communities with less 
suspicion (see Maurer 2012). In this account, financial technologies such as µPRELOH
PRQH\¶ RSHQ XS Qovel and exciting possibilities for democratizing monetary and 
financial inclusion. The poor do not always behave as technologies anticipate, but 
actively (re)shape monetary spaces through innovations such as informal money transfer 
mechanisms. Indeed, as the µILQDQFLDO GLDULHV¶ OLWHUDWXUH illustrates, far from being 
excluded, poor households are often accustomed to managing a multiplicity of formal and 
informal financial instruments (Collins 2005, 2008; Kamath et al. 2010). Since such 
practices can provide new sources of (legitimate) profits from high volume, low value 
transactions, industry participants observe closely how the poor innovate (Costa and 
Ehrbeck 2015). Philanthropists, development agencies and regulators see unprecedented 
opportunities for effective development interventions with low infrastructural and 
investment requirements.  
However, we argue in this paper that it is important to examine critically the contours of 
a fast-evolving fintech-philanthropy-development (FPD) complex. This should be 
understood against the backdrop of rapid growth of a digital underworld that feeds 
available data into opaque algorithmic processes that are increasingly used to organize 
economic life (Pasquale 2015). This reflects a transformation in the field of predictive 
algorithm design, from anticipating consumer decisions (Agrawal et al. 1993) to 
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producing geographies of suspicion in the securitization of the war on terror (see Amoore 
2009); opening up new possibilities to generate a screened economy of (appetite for) risk 
in low-income countries.  
The process of harvesting digital footprints simultaneously involves the poRU¶V XVH RI
PRELOHWHFKQRORJLHVDQG WKHVWDWH¶V LQFUHDVLQJO\GLJLWDOL]HGVRFLDOWUDQVIHUV, the latter in 
recognition that the state, through private digital entrepreneurs, can connect (poor) 
populations to algorithms. The practices of digital-based FI delineate µat risk¶ populations 
into categories of borrowers (Kear 2013, Kamiska 2015), incorporating the poor into 
global strategies of capital accumulation through digital footprints, a project particularly 
apt for (chaotically) shaping financial(ized) subjectivities.  
The scholarship on material cultures of financialisation and the associated 10Cs (Fine, 
this issue) provides a useful lens through which to examine this complex network of 
discourses and practices. In particular, we are interested in how digital technologies-
based FI is Constructed through material practices, Collective in promoting 
financialisation, Closed in confining policy-making to an increasingly powerful digital 
elite with little Contestation from official development actors. We trace a discursive shift 
that attributes market failures, not to poorly regulated financial markets and institutions, 
but to individual consumers whose behavioural traits can be captured, shaped and 
µFRUUHFWHG¶ WKURXJK behavioural economics (see World Bank 2014, 2015). This 
GLVMXQFWXUH LV PLUURUHG LQ GHYHORSPHQW GLVFRXUVHV WKDW QDWXUDOLVH µWKH PDUNHW¶ ZLWK D
VKLIWLQHPSKDVLVIURPFRUUHFWLQJPDUNHWIDLOXUHVµPDNLQJPDUNHWVZRUNIRUWKHSRRU¶WR
creating market subjects (Berndt 2015). Cognitively deficient financial subjects must now 
OHDUQWREHµUHVLOLHQW¶ WRPDUNHWVKRFNV&ODUNHWKURXJKILQDQFLDOHGXFDWLRQ (Kear 
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2013, Marron 2013, Santos this issue) RU IDLOLQJ WKDW µQXGJH¶ WHFKQLTXHV :RUOG%DQN
2015; Berndt 2015). This µFRQVHQVXV¶, locating the cause and solution of financial crises 
in consumer fallibility, has thus spurred a phase in development thinking and practice that 
VHHNVWRIXUWKHUHPEHGµFRPPRGLW\FDOFXODWLRQ¶see Introduction, this issue) in everyday 
household decision making (see World Bank 2015). Meanwhile, the rapid diffusion of 
mobile technologies in developing countries provides the technological infrastructure 
through which financial providers, facilitated by these global networks, can µUHDFK WKH
XQEDQNHG¶and shape financial subjectivities.  
A defining feature of financial(ised) inclusion as enabled by new information 
technologies, particularly mobile technology, is what we refer to as the 
µcommodification¶ of a new class of financial consumer, or more accurately, of her 
personal data. Central to this vision is the potential of digital technologies to capture the 
GDWDRIWKHQHZO\µLQFOXGHG¶LQZD\VWKDWHQDEOHOHQGHUVWRPDSNQRZDQGJRYHUQµULVN\¶
SRSXODWLRQV¶,QRWKHUZRUGVUDWKHUWKDQVHHNWRUHRUJDQLVHSHRSOHDQGWKLQJVVSDWLDOO\LQ
RUGHUWRUHQGHUVRFLHWLHVµOHJLEOH¶FI6FRWW8), mobile technologies provide the means 
WRµDGPLQLVWUDWLYHO\UH-RUGHU¶SRSXODWLRQVLQQHZZD\VE\engaging individual citizens in 
the process of creating themselves as legible subjects (Ruppert et al. 2013). This project 
of digital legibility is Closed in the sense defined by Fine (this issue), as the assumptions 
underpinning the algorithms of the predictive industry are the proprietary knowledge of 
an increasingly powerful digital elite, while the development of research methodologies 
that might render algorithms transparent, for example through institutional practices and 
effects, are at a nascent stage (Ruppert et al. 2013).  
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The paper is organized as follows. We first outline the historical emergence of a 
development agenda focused on financial inclusion. We then examine the institutional 
contours and practices of the FPD complex. We argue that the harvesting and monitoring 
RI GLJLWDO IRRWSULQWV WKDW IHHGV LQWR EHKDYLRXUDO PRGHOV RI µNQRZ WK\ (irrational) 
FXVWRPHU¶, DQGWKHJURZLQJLPSRUWDQFHRIµQXGJLQJWHFKQLTXHV¶, points to the emergence 
of a firmly disciplinary trait in the financialisation project in international development. 
This, we conclude, opens up important research questions of how households and agents 
Construe the processes described, and their emerging techniques of resistance to, and 
transformation of, the sophisticated range of digital surveillance techniques. 
Financial inclusion: the emergence of an international development agenda 
FI was conceived as an analytical lens through which to understand the relationship 
between finance and the poor (Marron 2013). Early research on financial exclusion 
explored the ways in which financial institutions discriminated against certain socio-
economic groups (Dymski and Veitsch 1992; Leyshon and Thrift 1995, 1996). This 
critical reading explored questions of how the financial sector structurally shapes and 
sharpens inequality by system(at)LFDOO\IDYRXULQJµWKHULFKDQGSRZHUIXO¶. Exclusion was 
thus the fault and responsibility of financial capital, that conducts µan insidious and 
relatively unremarked-upon assault >«@ upon poorer and disadvantaged groups¶ 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1995: 314).   
Early proposals to force banks to include the poor were deemed problematic at both 
ideological and political levels. Exclusion was thus reframed as a question of individual 
accessibility rather than structural marginalization, and policies focused on removing 
obsWDFOHVWRSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQµQRUPDO¶DFWLYLWLHV.HPSVRQDQG:K\OH\; Johnson and 
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Arnold 2012). Demand-side explanations of individual accessibility ± WKH µLQGLYLGXDO
WXUQ¶ LQ), VWXGLHV ± took centre stage (Marron 2013). According to these, low-income 
households could not meet the price of certain financial products, were not aware of 
others and, ultimateO\ ZHUH µSV\FKRORJLFDOO\¶ un(der)prepared to see themselves as 
financial subjects (Kempson et al. 2000). Policy focused on persuading banks, without 
direct regulation, to expand provision of financial services to the excluded, who would in 
turn be better educated through financial literacy campaigns. Subsidies, private-public 
partnerships 1  and market-making regulations would incentivize banks to create new 
products tailored to the excluded.    
By the late 2000s, FI had travelled across borders to anchor a new, finance-based, 
development paradigm. The World Bank played an important role. Its economists 
dedicated substantial efforts to demonstrating empirically that financial development 
leads to (pro-poor) economic growth (see Beck, Levine and Loayza 2000; Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2004), thus legitimizing WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V ILQDQFLDO
liberalization agenda. FI helped re-frame the early emphasis on microfinance as the 
market-based solution to poverty (Roy 2010; Soederberg 2013). Celebrated in the 1990s 
DV µWKH YDFFLQH IRU WKH SDQGHPLF RI SRYHUW\¶ PLFURILQDQFH LQLWLDWLYHV such as the 
Grameen Bank drew attention to the SRWHQWLDO RI µSHHU OHQGLQJ¶ WKURXJK ZKLFK ZHOO-
organized groups could access credit by replacing economic collateral with the discipline 
of peer µsolidarity¶ through group-based lending, to ensure repayment and thus the 
ILQDQFLDOµVXVWDLQDELOLW\¶RIPLFURILQDQFHSURJUDPPHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV.   
Yet microfinance, as most other market-based development initiatives, failed to achieve 
µVXFFHVV¶even on its own terms ± that is in fostering WKHSRRU¶V entrepreneurship (World 
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Bank 2008). One oft-cited reason for failure is breach of the principle of financial 
sustainability expected to govern microfinance institutions (MFIs). This required that 
loans be used only for productive activities and extended at market interest rates (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007). Moreover, the attempts to impose market discipline 
typically meant that microfinance clients had to specialize in activities with high 
uncertainty, short profit cycles and limited profitability (Shakia and Rankin 2008). Nor 
did microfinance manage to consistently reach the excluded. Instead, loan officers 
typically resorted to pressuring existing borrowers to take larger loans on longer terms. 
By early 2008, concerns with over-indebtedness and scepticism about the development 
potential of microfinance became pervasive (Duvendak et al. 2011).  
More fundamentally, the microfinance model did not disproportionately benefit the poor, 
as was originally claimed. Findings from research in Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
South and Southeast Asia and South Africa have revealed that a development approach 
FHQWUHG RQ PLFURFUHGLW µprogrammatically disadYDQWDJHV WKH SRRU LQ WKH ORQJHU UXQ¶
(Bateman 2014: 100, original emphasis), since it directs resources WRZDUGVµYHU\VPDOO± 
often one-person firms of low productivity¶ that might otherwise have been channelled 
towards a nascent SME sector as a foundation for economic growth and employment 
(also Duvendak et al. 2011). In this respect, the microfinance model has been described 
DV µanti-GHYHORSPHQWDO¶; instead of delivering sustainable development, generating a 
succession of µERRP WR EXVW¶ HSLVRGHV in countries as diverse as Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Morocco, Pakistan and Bosnia (Bateman 2014: 102). 
In Finance for All (World Bank 2008) the Bank side-stepped such pressing questions 
about the pitfalls of market-based financial sector development. It re-directed attention 
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from specialist MFIs to mainstream financial institutions, and to the broadening of the 
GHILQLWLRQ RI µSUR-SRRU¶ ILQDQFLDO VHUYLFHV WR LQFOXGH savings and payments services 
alongside lending, targeting both households and small businesses. Above all, 
interventions were to be entirely market-based. The Bank warned governments to avoid 
repeating earlier µmistakes¶ ZLWK µPDUNHW-VXEVWLWXWLQJ¶SROLFLHV VXEVLGL]HG OHQGLQJUDWHV
or government ownership of financial institutions). Instead, the Bank insisted that 
governments focus on market-developing policies, including macroeconomic stability 
and financial deepening as supply-side interventions that would create instruments for 
risk diversification and thus allow banks to engage with higher-risk consumers.   
The global financial crisis in the same year brought into sharp focus the fragility 
underpinning projects to extend financial participation, throwing into doubt the wisdom 
of a major expansion of market-based FI. Scholars argued that µWKH RUJ\ RI VXESULPH
OHQGLQJ¶LQWKH86A was a consequence of market-based forms of FI (French et al. 2009). 
The pre-crisis wisdom that exclusion from financial services imposes costs mutated into 
an overt anxiety that inclusion may do the same, by encouraging banks to generate and 
manage risky assets IURP µVXESULPH¶ ERUURZHUV. The %DQN¶V UHVSRQVH was swift, and 
sought to re-Construct the market-based FI agenda as the only way forward. Indeed, the 
SUHPLVH EHKLQG :RUOG %DQN¶V *OREDO )LQGH[ database is that the relationship between 
KRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRILQDQFHDQGGHYHORSPHQWRXWFRmes can only be properly theorised 
with empirical evidence from cross-country, time-series data (Demigurc-Kunt and 
Klapper 2012). In other words, empirical evidence of a particular kind would be 
necessary to demonstrate that the US subprime moment was anything other than an 
isolated exception in an otherwise positive account of FI.  
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The 2014 :RUOG%DQN¶VIODJVKLS*OREDO)LQDQFLDO'HYHORSPHQW5HSRUWGHGLFDWHGWRFI, 
took these scholarly µFOHDQVLQJ¶Hfforts further. On a macro level, the Report addresses 
the unavoidable question of the analytical link between FI and financial instability. While 
recognizing that over-indebtedness can lead to financial instability where financial 
LQVWLWXWLRQVKDYHSHUYHUVH LQFHQWLYHVWRHPEUDFHDµILQDQFH IRU DOODWDOOFRVWV¶DSSURDFK
the empirical sections of the Report reject any correlation, let alone causality, between FI 
and financial stability across a large set of high and low income countries (see Cihak et 
al. 2013). In doing so, the Report dismisses evidence in support of state intervention 
through subsidies and state-owned banks in developing countries ± D µGHYHORSPHQWDO¶
approach to finance (see Bateman 2014 for example) ± and instead pushes for private 
VHFWRU LQQRYDWLRQ DV WKH VRXUFH RI QHZSURGXFWV DQG VHUYLFHV WKDWZLOO µDGGUHVVPDUNHW
failures, meet consumer needs, DQGRYHUFRPHEHKDYLRUDOSUREOHPV¶ World Bank 2014: 
3).  
In other words, despite the lip-service paid to the systemic implications of over-
indebtedness, the pre-crisis enthusiasm for FI as a market-based panacea for inequality 
and development remained intact. This allows for state intervention as long as it is of the 
µULJKW¶NLQG, as explained by the Bank in its discussions of development financing in the 
post-2015 era (World Bank 2013). For the Bank, aid should be seen as one of a range of 
institutional and policy levers used to attract and secure private finance for development. 
Indeed, its own International Finance Corporation (IFC) channels funds directly to 
financial intermediaries in emerging markets as a strategy to IRVWHUµILQDQFLDOGHHSHQLQJ
and inclusion for private sector-OHGJURZWK¶:RUOG%DQN: 32).  
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,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHSRZHURIPLFURILQDQFHDVDµPRELOLVLQJQDUUDWLYH¶KDVSODyed a central 
± but paradoxical ± role in bridging the microfinance and FI eras in international 
development (Mader 2016; Rankin 2013). While the µresilience¶ of the microfinance 
model stemmed from its limited financialisation as a µFORVHGHFRV\VWHP¶ the model has 
more recently been recast DVDµVDIHLQYHVWPHQW¶LQDQHZSXVKWRRSHQXSPLFURILQDQFH
institutions to global investors. Thus the emphasis shifted from the financial sustainability 
imperative to the profitability of microfinance instruments, with often devastating 
consequences for the poorest borrowers (Aitken 2010; Rankin 2013).  
The IFC has been a major driver of what Soederberg (2013) calls WKH µVOLFH DQG GLFH¶
development approach that prioritizes securitization of microfinance instruments in 
developing countries. In this context, the term securitization refers to the conversion and 
packaging of microloans into liquid securities that can be traded on financial markets, in 
a similar manner to the asset-based securitization (ABS) that led to the subprime 
µPRPHQW¶DQG the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the IFC portrays ABS as a risk-
reducing innovation that could help developing countries meet the growing demand for 
finance generated by successful FI strategies in conditions of capital scarcity. AV µWKH
ZRUOG¶VODUJHVWVXSSOLHURIILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVWRSULYDWHVHFWRUHQWLWLHVLQWKHJOREDO6RXWK¶, 
the IFC is attracted to securitization because it allows it to µH[SDQG LWV UHDFK ZLWKRXW
H[SDQGLQJLWV>RZQ@ULVNJDPEOH¶6RHGHUEHUJ: 602).  
Mapping the future? The Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
The promotion of FI as a development paradigm is not unique to the World Bank, but 
rather a symptom of a much larger shift to market-based FI in development cooperation. 
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, we have witnessed the emergence of networks of 
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policy makers in emerging/developing countries, international financial organisations, 
µphilanthropic LQYHVWPHQW ILUPV¶ and fintech companies whose interests are closely 
aligned in promoting FI.  
The most visible institutional structure is the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), 
which unites more than ninety developing and emerging countries in a commitment to 
mobilise FI as a µmethod to unlock human potential¶. Half of participating countries 
agreed to binding targets through the Maya declaration, targets that are designed and 
owned by each country, tailored to their conditions. Several participants also envisaged 
the adoption of national FI strategies that would include specific initiatives to achieve the 
Maya commitments. The World Bank applauded the impressive coordination effort, 
energized by the G20, and declared that it would realign resources in its country level 
missions towards the Maya priorities.  
As the AFI (2015, 2014a, 2013) Annual Reports make clear, the top thematic areas of the 
Maya commitments include financial literacy, digital financial services (electronic 
payments, mobile financial services, and agent banking) µSURSRUWLRQDO¶ ILQDQFLDO VHFWRU
regulation DQG ), GDWD 7KH ODUJHVW UHJLRQV ZLWK µXQEDQNHG¶ SRSXODWLRQV 6XE-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, emphasise digital financial services as a 
solution to problems of access for the population in rural DUHDVZKRVHµGLJLWDO IRRWSULQW¶
through use of mobile phones is significant. According to estimates from the Omidyar 
Network, by the end of 2015, 1.7 billion of the 2 billion without formal access to finance 
have a mobile phone (Costa and Ehrbeck 2015).  
That AFI would not simply be a new forum for coordinating state institutions in global 
development initiatives became obvious from its inception. With funding from the Gates 
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Foundation, AFI is administered by GIZ, the German public benefit enterprise that 
coordinates official German development cooperation. By 2014, the Omidyar Network 
would become the second philanthropic investment organization officially partnered with 
AFI (AFI 2015). Its mission is to combine µventure capital investments in innovative 
ideas to advDQFH ILQDQFLDO LQFOXVLRQ¶ ZLWK JUDQWV WKDW JHQHUDWH µWKH NQRZOHGJH DQG
DGYRFDF\ QHFHVVDU\ IRU DQ HFRV\VWHP LQ ZKLFK WKHVH LGHDV FDQ PDWXUH¶ &RVWD DQG
Ehrbeck 2015). The Omidyar Network thus funds and invests in fintech companies that 
can disrupt high information costs of credit risk assessment for the poor and thus leverage 
DQµHPHUJLQJORZHU-FRVW¶HQYLURQPHQWWKURXJKLQQRYDWLYHSURGXFWVDQGVHUYLFHV  
For the first few years of its existence, AFI remained a forum accessible exclusively to 
policy makers. That changed with the launch of the Public Private Dialogue Platform 
(PPD) in 2014. 7KH33'SURPLVHVSROLF\PDNHUVµSULYDWHVHFWRULQVLJKWV¶IRUGHYHORSLQJ
new SROLFLHVDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUµDQXQSUHFHGHQWHGRSSRUWXQLW\¶WRFRQQHFWWRSROLF\
PDNHUV ZKR DUH UHJXODWLQJ QHZ DQG KLJK JURZWK PDUNHWV DQG IXUWKHUPRUH D µKLJKO\
YLVLEOHH[KLELWLRQVSDFHLQ$),0DUNHW3ODFH¶$),: 1). By June 2015, Mastercard, 
Visa and BBVA (a global bank headquartered in Spain) had become AFI members, with 
more partnerships to be formalized in the future. Meanwhile, the AFI acts an umbrella 
and incubator for a growing number of global and regional FI programmes such as the 
UNDP-FXQGHG µ0RELOH 0RQH\ IRU WKH 3RRU¶ 003 DQG µ6KDSLQJ ,QFOXVLYH )LQDQFH
7UDQVIRUPDWLRQV¶6+,)7DPRQJRWKHUV 
The FPD complex thus sees the growing influence of a digital elite in development 
interventions with apparently little scope for contestation. Indeed, one key priority for the 
PPD platform is a dialogue on innovative products, business models and approaches, 
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predicated on the idea that technology and big data can play a critical role in enabling 
public-private partnerships for FI. Its strategic priorities evoke closely the digital 
ecosystem envisaged by the Omidyar Network, where innovative ideas can be developed 
DQG SXW LQWR SUDFWLFH ZLWK VXSSRUW IURP µSURJUHVVLYH¶ UHJXODWRUV &RVWD DQG (KUEHFN
2015) and an HPHUJLQJVFKRODUVKLSRQµSURSRUWLRQDWH UHJXODWLRQ¶ IRUH[DPSOH VHH7DLW
and Banda 2016). It is here that the politics of FI ± or financialised inclusion ± anchored 
in the digital revolution starts to become apparent.  
First, as Kaminska (2015) argues, beKLQG VXFK SURPLVHV OLHV D WKUHDW RI µILQDQFLDO
LQWUXVLRQ¶DQGDQH[SOLFLWstrategy to generate revenue streams from monetizing financial 
data. As such, the extent of genuine FRQVXPHU µFKRLFH¶ LVFRQVWUDLQHGE\Dn underlying 
requirement that all services Conform to the logic of a system of provision designed to 
generate such income streams. Here the group discipline associated with Grameen-type 
revolving microcredit loan is superseded by new forms of individual self-governance, 
facilitated by µGLVUXSWLYH¶GLJLWDOWHFKQRORJLHVGHYHORSHGZLWKVXSSRUWIURPSKLODQWKURSLF
organisations such as the Omidyar network. For example, Cignify Inc., a US-based 
fintech company receives funding to further its strategic goal of disrupting traditional 
credit risk assessment. Headed by a former IFC director, Cignify first partnered with OI 
Telecom in Brazil in 2010 and then with Telefonica, a telecom operator with presence 
across Latin American countries, to test its credit-scoring platform (Cignifi 2014).  
Cignifi¶V business model involves creating credit scores for mobile phone users without a 
credit history, by predicting behavior from the patterns of calls and text messages. Credit 
scores extracted from a behavioral track record can help measure the appetite for 
fiQDQFLDO SURGXFWV DPRQJ µHPHUJLQJ FXVWRPHUV¶ DVZHOO DV default risk (Cignifi 2014). 
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Another Omidyar investment, Revolution Credit, exemplifies how the FPD complex not 
RQO\WUDFNVEXWDOVRFUHDWHVGLJLWDOIRRWSULQWV3RWHQWLDOµWKLQILOH¶ERUURZHUVDUHLnvited 
to participate in online games and quizzes that generate behavioral data, in turn fed in 
predictive algorithms (Costa and Ehrbeck 2015). Put differently, data and algorithms 
become critical to pushing the risk frontier in low-income countries, as fintech companies 
create, collect and commodify behavioral data ZLWKLQ DQ µHFRV\VWHP¶ IRVWHUHG E\
networks of philanthropic investors, development finance institutions and donors and 
policy makers in participating countries.  
Furthermore, the state also plays an important role in the commercial processes of 
harvesting and commodification of digital footprints. Thus, a spinoff from the AFI, the 
Better than Cash Alliance, takes the project of (re)-constructing digital footprints even 
further by accelerating the transition from cash to digital payments globally. Set up in 
2012, the Alliance ostensibly promotes a partnership between governments, private sector 
and international organizations involved in development (the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) alongside the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and global NGOs such as CARE, Concern Worldwide), funded the 
BMGF and Omidyar Network (with USAID, Mastercard, Citi Foundation and Visa). Its 
first case study, written by the Bankable Frontier Associates with advice from the World 
%DQN3D\PHQWJURXSH[SORUHV0H[LFR¶VGHFLVLRQWRVKLIWIURPFDVKWRGLJLWDOSD\PHQWV
for government-to-person payments (salaries, pensions and cash transfers). The greatest 
promise for FI, it VWUHVVHVLVWRGLJLWDOL]HVRFLDOWUDQVIHUVWKXVUHDFKLQJWKHµXQEDQNDEOH¶
at a stroke through the long arm of the state. The slow progress in digitalizing social cash 
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transfers, it argues, stems from a lack of incentives for governments that can be addressed 
through the Maya Commitments to FI (Babatz 2013). 
In its report commissioned by the Better than Cash Alliance, the aptly named Bankable 
Frontier Associates (2014PDGHFOHDUZKDWLVDWVWDNHLQWKHµMRXUQH\WRZDUGVFDVKOLWH¶. 
For financial service providers, the opportunities for FI via digital payments do not arise 
from increasing use of bank deposits by the previously unbanked, since bank accounts are 
QRW µGDLO\ UHOHYDQW¶5DWKHU opportunities µcome from financial service providers using 
the digital information generated by e-payments and receipts to form a profile for each 
individual customer. This digital profiling then enables providers to offer more 
appropriate and relevant products. Even beyond the use of e-payment records, businesses 
are startLQJ WR XVH RWKHU µGLJLWDO IRRWSULQWV¶ VXFK DV PRELOH SKRQH FDOOLQJ UHFRUGV DQG
VRFLDO QHWZRUN WUDIILF WR RIIHU FUHGLW WR WKH H[FOXGHG JURXSV¶ (Bankable Frontier 
Associates 2014: 8). Thus alongside or in cooperation with private digital entrepreneurs, 
the state can accelerate global finance¶VDFFHVV to the poor¶s digital footprints, while at 
the same time rendering off-JULGSRSXODWLRQVµOHJLEOH¶6FRWWDQGWKXVJRYHUQDEOH
in new ways (cf. Ruppert 2012).  
It is no coincidence that, along with its FI portfolio, Omidyar is developing drone 
technology to confirm and protect property rights in low-income countries. Its deep 
involvement in AFI and the Better than Cash Alliance will allow it to put such 
µWUDQVIRUPDWLYH WHFKQRORJLHV¶ DW WKH centre of initiatives to energize FI, involving a 
constant monitoring of the assets of borrowers and potentially their movements. 2 
Omidyar Network is investing in a broad range of fintech start-ups governed by a µNQRZ
thy (irrational) customer¶SKLORVRSK\RI KDUQHVVLQJ WKHGLJital revolution to the aims of 
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FI)RUH[DPSOH=RRQDLQ6RXWK$IULFDVWUHVVHVWKDWWKHµXQEDQNDEOH¶FRQVXPHUH[LVWVLQ
a very different world, her financial decisions shaped by considerations other than those 
at play in the offices of fintech companies. Using behavioral economics to map and 
understand those decisions would thus render D FRQWLQHQW ZLWK D µKLJK GHPRJUDSKLF
GLYLGHQG¶DQGKLJKSRYHUW\PRUHDWWUDFWLYHWRIRUHLJQFDSLWDO 
Indeed, one of the promises that Cignifi makes is to continuously track changes in 
customer performance as mobile phone data are refreshed. A mobile phone, whose use 
can IHHGGDWDFDSWXULQJWKHµPRYHIURPRQHEHKDYLRUDOVWDWHWRDQRWKHU¶&LJQLIL: 7), 
would become a new Panopticon for self-regulating financial behavior in ways that 
preserve mobile-data based credit scores. 7KXVWKHµGLJLWDOUHYROXWLRQ¶now increasingly 
underpinning FI adds new layers to the construction of financial governmentality. 
In sum, the fintech vision of financial inclusion ± know thy (irrational) customer ± is a 
market-led process that harnesses the power of technology, the better understanding of 
human behavior and broad political support. It is a vision that celebrates the possibilities 
for simultaneously achieving positive returns, philanthropy and human development. 
Know thy (irrational) customer: digital technologies and financial (self) government 
FI is therefore a process not only of bringing the µXQEDQNDEOH¶ into the market, and 
making governable subjects more legible to the state, but also one of deploying the assets 
they generate for broader strategies of capital accumulation that are far from transparent 
(Roy 2012; Soederberg 2013). Governing the conduct of µrisky populations¶ involves 
finding new ways to securitize income streams from the hitherto excluded through the 
creation and trading of new types of asset, FRPELQHGZLWKLQQRYDWLYHDSSURDFKHVWRµGH-
risking people who would otherwise be too risky to OHQG WR¶ .DPLnska 2015: 1). 
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Paradoxically, just as new technologies and products appear to shorten the distance 
between global banks and households (Finlayson 2009; Soederberg 2014), new processes 
RIµGLVWDQFLQJ¶DUHXQGHUZD\. These obscure the role of the newly included in a system 
whose inner workings are increasingly complex and opaque (Clapp 2014). 
Central to this vision is the potential of digital technologies to capture the data of the 
QHZO\ µLQFOXGHG¶ in ways that enable lenders to map, know and govHUQ µULVN\¶ 
populations. In other words, rather than seeking to reorganise people and things spatially 
in order to render societies µOHJLEOH¶ FI 6FRWW , data generated via mobile 
technologies SURYLGH WKHPHDQV WR µDGPLQLVWUDWLYHO\ UH-RUGHU¶populations in new ways, 
EDVHGRQWKHµPRYLQJWDUJHW¶RIEHKDYLRXUDOGDWDDVRSSRVHGWRPRUHVWDEOHµEDFNJURXQG¶
characteristics. Through processes that are far from transparent, therefore, previously out 
of reach citizens participate µLQWHU-SDVVLYHO\¶in becoming legible subjects (Ruppert 2011; 
Ruppert et al. 2013). 2PLG\DU1HWZRUN¶VVWUDWHJ\RIHVWDEOLVKLQJDSUHVHQFHHYHQWXDOO\
dominant) in the different nodes of the digital ecosystem underpinning FI, in close 
partnership with state institutions, offers a powerful example of the common project of 
digital legibility.  
This generates data that can be used in two ways: to inform behaviour change strategies 
used by lenders WRµQXGJH¶LQGLYLGXDOEHKDYLRXULQGHVLUHGGLUHFWLRQV; and to inform risk 
management strategies that diffuse risk among various others in an increasingly complex 
chain of actors (Kaminska 2015). In either FDVHWREHµLQFOXGHG¶ LVWREHexcluded from 
knowledge of the workings of a Closed system into which poor consumers are 
incorporated as a class of borrowers whose rights to privacy are suspended until such 
WLPHDVIXOOILQDQFLDOFLWL]HQVKLSLVµHDUQHG¶3  
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Meanwhile, a growing body of literature, drawing on tenets of behavioural economics, is 
DW KDQG WR SURYLGH IXUWKHU OHJLWLPDWLRQ RI WKLV IUDPLQJ RI WKH SRRU FRQVXPHU DV µULVN\
VXEMHFW¶ QRW OHDVW IURP WKH VHOI-QDPHG µNQRZOHGJH EDQN¶ LWVHOI Just as early accounts 
portrayed the prototySLFDOVXESULPHERUURZHUDVWKHµsingle African American woman¶, 
distinctly ill-suited to participate in financial markets (Squires 2011), the FI development 
narrative links financial instability to consumers¶ µEHKDYLRUDO SUREOHPV¶ (World Bank 
2014). Financial education has therefore assumed a new importance in the international 
development field; as Grameen-style group-EDVHGGLVFLSOLQHDQGµVROLGDULW\¶give way to 
individualised financial government.  
6XFK LQWHUYHQWLRQV DUH XQGHUVWRRG LQ WHUPV RI DQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ SHUYDVLYH µUHVLOLHQFH
GRFWULQH¶ ZKLFK YLHZV PDUNHW FULVHV DV µQDWXUDO¶ SKHQRPHQD DJDLQVW ZKLFK individual 
citizens and households must become resilient. In this context, then, financial education 
LVDµWUDLQLQJ LQUHVLOLHQFH¶RUDELOLW\WRZLWKVWDQGPDUNHWVKRFNV&ODUNH. On the 
other hand, it is acknowledged that financial literacy alone may be insufficient for the 
SRRUWREHDEOHWRDFFHVVDQGEHQHILWIURPILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVVLQFHµindividuals can have 
financial knowledge but still make irrational financial GHFLVLRQV¶ (World Bank 2014: 23). 
,QVWHDGDGHTXDWHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVQHFHVVLWDWHVDUDQJHRIµpsychological 
traits and motivations associated with financial capability¶ LQFOXGLQJ VHOI-control. Poor 
consumers are Constructed as more likely to make mistakes, either because they are 
irrational or because they suffer from cognitive limitations (Van Order, Firestone and 
Zorn 2007).   
This way of envisaging the decision-making processes of the poor finds its clearest 
expression in the 2015 World Development Report (World Bank 2015, see Fine et al. 
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2016 for a critique). In this Report, poverty µLVQRWRQO\DGHILFLWLQPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVEXW
also a context in which decisions are made. It can impose a cognitive burden on 
LQGLYLGXDOV WKDW PDNHV LW HVSHFLDOO\ GLIILFXOW IRU WKHP WR WKLQN GHOLEHUDWLYHO\¶ (World 
Bank 2015: 13). Instead, poor people are said to rely RQ µDXWRPDWLF¶ GHFLVLRQ-making. 
Financial distress, the Report argues, affects thinking capacity and even IQ. Put another 
ZD\SRYHUW\ LPSRVHVD µFRJQLWLYH WD[¶6ROXWLRQV are put forwardGUDZQ IURPµQXGJH¶
theory, involving WKH XVH RI µFKRLFH DUFKLWHFWXUH¶ WR QXGJH FRQVXPHUV RU SRWHQWLDO
FRQVXPHUVLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIµEHWWHU¶FKRLFHVcf. Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  
High consumer debt is thus conceptualised as the result of poor consumers thinking 
µDXWRPDWLFDOO\¶ rather than deliberativelyMXVWLI\LQJDQDUURZXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµILQDQFLDO
HGXFDWLRQ¶DVFKDQQHOOLQJEHKDYLRXULQSDUWLFXODUGLUHFWLRQVZLWKRXWUHYHDOLQJWKHORJLFRI
the system within which such behaviours are deemed necessary. However, this 
construction of the irrational, financially illiterate DQG µH[FOXGHG¶ consumer is at odds 
with the more sophisticated individual that emerges from research that draws on poor 
people¶V µILQDQFLDOGLDULHV¶, charting instances of actual (rather than imagined) financial 
behaviour (Collins 2005, 2008; Kamath et al. 2010). Such accounts, in which consumers 
of a range of formal and informal financial services engage in complex financial 
strategies combining acts of borrowing, saving and lending, are notable by their absence 
in the design of programmes for financial education in a development context. 
Needless to say, while behaviourism provides the conceptual framework for 
understanding the borrower, this is not so for the lender (World Bank 2015: 14). The 
Global Financial Development Report (World Bank 2014) specifically downplays the 
role of financial actors in creating systemic instability, suggesting that financial 
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institutions can only exploit consumers lacking financial capability. Ultimately, over-
indebtedness is a mark of individual behavioural shortcomings rather than structural 
dynamics in the financial sector. In this context, the decision by the World Bank (2015) 
to elaborate on insights from the discipline of behavioural economics makes sense as a 
means to accommodate this Contradictory position and µH[SODLQ¶ LUUDWLRQDO FRQVXPHU
behaviour without displacing neoclassical economics as the hegemonic discipline, and 
µWKH LQGLYLGXDO¶ DV WKHXQLW RI DQDO\VLV thus steering the debate well clear of structural 
explanations of the financial crisis (Fine et al. 2016).  
From a Foucauldian governmentality perspective that eschews the inclusion/exclusion 
binary, these developments can be read as a problem of financial government which is 
progressing along with, and through, the production of new subjectivities that are 
µHPLQHQWO\JRYHUQDEOHE\ ILQDQFLDOPHDQV¶ .HDU 3: 1). This line of enquiry moves 
the analytical lens onto the (discursive) production of financial subjectivities and the 
exercise of political power through calculative rationalities (Lemke, 2000, see also Fine, 
this issue:KLOHQHROLEHUDOLVPLQYROYHVDWWHPSWVWRXQLYHUVDOL]HWKHµKRPR economicus¶
since the µVHOI-UHJXODWLQJFDSDFLWLHVRIVXEMHFWV«KDYHEHFRPHNH\UHVRXUFHV¶0LOOHU
and Rose 2008: 26) ILQDQFLDOL]DWLRQ WUDQVIRUPV µHYHU\GD\ OLIH¶ FUHDWLQJ QHZ ILQDQFLDO
identities that Conform to the requirements of expanding financial markets (Langley, 
2008; 2010). FI is thus conceived as a new form of governmentality, rolling out tiered 
IRUPVRISULYDWHILQDQFLDOµJRYHUQPHQW¶WKDWSURGXFHVDQGUHODWHVWKHILQDQFLDOVHOIYHVWR
power (Kear 2013).  
Thus FI discourses mark a broader shift to fosWHULQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDbility to deal with 
contingencies and uncertainties that welfare states had addressed in the past through 
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collective pooling of risk in public pensions, health, housing, education and labour 
market protection (Kear 2013). From this asset-based welfare perspective (Finlayson 
2009), and with the emphasis now firmly on the individual consumer, risk is no longer 
solely a threat, but can become an opportunity for profit for µUHVLOLHQW¶ consumers in 
possession of the right calculative practices and attitudes to risk (Marron 2013; Bryan and 
Rafferty 2014; Clarke 2015). FI as a development paradigm, therefore, envisages no 
material change in the (changing) structures that generate marginality, but rather seeks to 
channel individual behaviour, through digital surveillance and education, to engage and 
identify with these structures.  
Upgrading the financial subject, Marron (2013: 11) argues, is not solely a question of 
equipping individuals with the right risk management frameworks. Financial subjects are 
DOVRH[SHFWHGWRµILQGPHDQLQJYDOXHDQGVHOI-H[SUHVVLRQ¶WKURXJKWKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ
financial activities; if they cannot, they are Construed as VXIIHULQJ IURP µEHKDYLRXUDO
SUREOHPV¶ LVVXHV RI µVHOI-FRQWURO¶ DQG VKRUWDJHV RI µFRJQLWLYH UHVRXUFHV¶ :RUOG Bank 
2015). +HUHZHILQGWKHIDPLOLDUFRQWUDGLFWLRQVµLQWKHDVVHPEO\RIWKHILQDQFLDOVXEMHFW¶
(Langley 2007: 85) that Fine (this issue) attributes to the Chaotic nature of the material 
culture of financialisation.  
Before the global financial crisis, FI discourses ± promoted by international development 
agencies ± FHOHEUDWHGKRXVHKROGV¶UROHDVULVNDEVRUEHUVRIODVWUHVRUW%U\DQDQG5DIIHUW\
2014: 408). Similarly, global finance saw the poor as bHLQJDµFULVLV-UHVLOLHQWDVVHWFODVV¶
ZLWK D µORZ WKUHVKROG IRU ULVN¶ 6RHGHUEHUJ: 606, see also Clarke 2015) that held 
great promise for securitisation. The global financial crisis threw into question this 
optimism when it revealed that the combination of high unemployment and high food 
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prices left the poor unwilling to prioritise loan repayments over daily subsistence, 
suggesting that financialisation and its effects may not have gone completely un-
Contested, see Santos (this issue). The daily monitoring of digital footprints that feeds 
into behavioural models of µNQRZWK\LUUDWLRQDOFXVWRPHU¶ and the growing importance 
RI µQXGJLQJ WHFKQLTXHV¶ SRLQWV WR WKH UHYLYDO RI D PRUH GLVFLSOLQDU\ WUDLW RI WKH
financialisation project in international development, with an increasingly sophisticated 
range of digital surveillance techniques.  
However, it would be a mistake to treat these reconfigurations as evidence of the 
unContestable nature of financialisation (see Fine this issue). Indeed, a material culture of 
financialisation approach raises two questions which merit further investigation. First, it 
is important to reflect on the practices of resistance that are possible in this new world of 
rapidly expanding digital technologies. How will we resist dystopian futures of self-
governance and discipline where a smartphone or a smartwatch would allow global 
finance to constantly monitor our everyday lives for signs of irrationality that can 
threaten the valuation of liquid assets generated through digital footprints? Second, the 
discourses of the FPD complex give the impression of more control, more reach than 
occurs in reality. As Maurer (2012) points out, attempts by the financial industry to 
µIRUPDW¶WKHSRRULQWRFXVWRPHUVKDYHEHHQVXEYHUWHGDQGWUDQVIRUPHGSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVH
the poor innovate, appropriating technologies in ways that cannot be predicted by 
algorithms or their creators. Or can they? At present, research methodologies for 
investigating patterns and processes of digital subjectification, and the potential for 
innovation and resistance, are at an early stage (Ruppert et al. 2013). Nevertheless, just as 
in the subprime crisis when consumers resisted pressures to prioritise loan repayment, 
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further research is needed to identify and understand evolving practices of adoption, 
adaptation and resistance at the frontiers of financialisation in developing countries.   
Conclusion  
The global spread of individualised asset-based welfare (see Robertson in this issue in 
context of housing), FI and the power of global finance, uninterrupted by the financial 
crisis of 2008 (although not necessarily uniform in its implementation, see Prabhakar 
2013), should be understood as connected in tandem with one another. To address their 
PXWXDO G\QDPLFV WKHUHIRUH LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR XQGHUVWDQG KRZ WKH VXESULPH µPRPHQW¶
now perversely being recast as development policy, is being extended to new markets in 
WKH6RXWKXQGHUDµGHYHORSPHQW¶EDQQHU. The key words are access via digital footprints ± 
QRWRQO\WKHDELOLW\RIWKHµXQEDQNHG¶WRDFFHVVILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVEXWIRUILQDQFLDOFDSLWDO
WRDFFHVVQHZµULVN IURQWLHUV¶ZLWKLQDn institutional and policy framework that enables 
financial actors to µGH-ULVN¶ individual consumers through constant monitoring.  
Since the crisis, there has been a convergence of policy and knowledge co-production, 
and in particular the employment of behaviouralism as justification and guide to future 
development practice (World Bank 2015). However, these discourses of inclusion (and 
µDFFHVV¶REVFXUH the desire and momentum of financial capital to access high risk/high 
return markets (KaminVND,QWKLVFDVHWKHUROHRIWKHVWDWHLVUHFDVWWRSURYLGHµDQ
HQDEOLQJ HQYLURQPHQW¶ IRU ILQDQFLDO FDSLWDO WR IORZ IUHHO\ ZKLOH DOORZLQg the 
consequences of systemic risks to be transferred to consumers precariously positioned at 
WKH µEDQNDEOH IURQWLHU¶ ZKLOH WKHLU µGLJLWDO IRRWSULQWV¶ DUH FDSWXUHG DQG quantified as 
evidence of potential income streams against which securitised loans can be made that 
IRUPWKHEDVLVIRUWRPRUURZ¶VILQDQFLDOµLQQRYDWLRQV¶ 
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This analysis of financial(ised) inclusion as a multi-tiered process of financial subject 
formation (Kear 2012SURYLGHVDXVHIXOOHQVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJZK\WKHUHVKRXOGEHµDQ
absence of genuine Contestation¶ 6DQWRV this issue, p???) in response to the 
identification of borrowers in need of education ± not lenders in need of regulatory 
reform ± as the primary source of risk to the financial system. This article has highlighted 
KRZ WKH QRUPDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH VXESULPH µPRPHQW¶ DV µEXVLQHVV DV XVXDO¶ ZRUOGZLGH LV
being facilitated via an ambitious global programme of market-based financial 
development that has the support of major donors and multilateral development banks.  
As an evolving international institutional infrastructure for FI, the FPD complex is 
extending reach and impact at a rapid pace and, in the process, generating a plethora of 
finance-based identities and possibilities that are hard to resist. One could conclude that, 
as predicted by other contributions to this volume, Contestation to such a well-resourced 
programme of incorporation would be limited. However, we would argue that further 
empirical research is needed to explore in more depth the processes of financial (self) 
governance and the (im)possibility of emergent forms of resistance to efforts to induce 
new populations to Conform to the µHWKRVRIFRPPRGLW\FDOFXODWLRQ¶ (Bayliss et al. this 
issue), before drawing conclusions about the ways in which the material cultures of 
financialisation are Construed by diverse actors in FI networks at different sites. 
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Notes 
                                                      
1 Through initiatives such as (tax-free) Individual Savings Account, stakeholder pensions, insure with rent 
schemes, and the promotion of credit unions. 
2 3HUX¶VVXSHULQWHQGHQWRIEDQNVDQGSHQVLRQIXQGVVXJJHVWHGDQHYHQPRUHG\VWRSLDQGLVFLSOLQLQJ
WHFKQLTXHIRUWKHµXQEDQNHG¶7KH),UHYROXWLRQhe argued, would solve employment problems in poor 
countries when accompanied by psychometric testing for those without formal education. Combined with 
WKH:RUOG%DQN¶VSDWKRORJ\RIWKHH[FOXGHGWKHVHZRXOGVHUYHWRFRQILUPWKHµVFDUFLW\¶RIFRJQLWLYH
resources in the poor, and to design behavioral-based approaches for discipline (AFI 2014a). 
3 Roy (2013) for example describes the post-FULVLVHIIRUWVRIWKH0RRG\¶V5HVHDUFK/DED³UHVHDUFK
LQFXEDWRU´UHFHQWO\HVWDEOLVKHGZLWKLQ0RRG\¶V&RUSRUDWLRQDQGSURYLGLQJFUHGLWUDWLQJVIRUGHEW
instruments and securities. The task of the lab is to map the risk frontiers associated with hitherto unbanked 
PDUNHWV´ 
 
